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Climate change is likely to compound existing development challenges in the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA), particularly the water crisis and the high dependence on food 
imports (Patel et al., 2016). Projected climate change trends include rising temperatures and 
extreme heat, increasing uncertainty in rainfall and water availability, sea level rises and an 
increase in extreme events including droughts, floods, storm surges and dust storms.  
The region’s agricultural sector, important for both livelihoods and national economies 
will be negatively affected in a number of ways. These include reductions in crop yields, 
shorter growing periods, and negative impacts on livestock such as change in disease vectors. 
Approximately, 70% of the region’s agriculture is rain-fed, making it vulnerable to changes in 
rainfall and heat.  
Water scarcity is a defining challenge in the region and a driver of the region’s reliance on 
food imports. Renewable water resources are over-exploited and depleted: per capita 
availability is below the 1000 m3 (the threshold below which a country is facing water scarcity) in 
most countries, with the exception of Iraq, Oman, Syria, and Lebanon (Waha et al., 2017). 
Transboundary water resources play an important role in many of the countries with the potential 
for tensions over rivers such as the Nile, the Tigris-Euphrates and the Jordan.  
Water stress in the region is not simply a matter of scarcity, but of poor management and 
governance. Drivers such as population growth are also increasing water demands. 
Unmanaged trade-offs in the water-energy-food nexus are also contributing to the over-
exploitation of water resources (World Bank, 2018).  
Despite a huge renewable energy potential across the region, there is an extremely high 
reliance on hydrocarbons for energy. In 2015, fossil fuel energy consumption represented 
97.38% of total energy consumed (Avis, 2020). The region’s countries can be roughly split into 
three groups: oil-producers (e.g. Saudi Arabia), non-oil producers (e.g. Morocco) and conflict-
affected countries (e.g. Iraq, Yemen and Syria), some of whom also have oil reserves. As a 
broad generalisation, the non-oil producing states import fossil fuels for electricity production 
from the oil-producers. Per capita energy emissions across the region are high due to drivers 
such as lifestyle and consumption patterns, and population growth.     
The water-energy-food nexus is extremely important in the region. A high dependence on 
food imports is a key coping strategy for water scarcity. Approximately 50% of domestic wheat 
and barley supply, 70% of rice consumption and 60% of corn consumption are met through 
imports (Waha et al., 2017). Reliance on food imports makes the region vulnerable to price 
shocks on global markets and the impacts of climate change on agriculture in other regions. 
Simultaneously, the agriculture sector is the region’s biggest water user: 85% of total water 
withdrawals are for agriculture. Both water and energy are heavily subsidised. Consequently, 
measure to make resource use more effective may need to be accompanied by targeted social 
protection measures (Schaar, 2019).  
Climate change may contribute to migration and could act as a threat multiplier in the 
region. For example, sea level rises in Alexandria, Egypt, could lead to people having to leave 
their homes, whilst, migration from rural households may be influenced by climate change 
impacts on agriculture and the viability of rural livelihoods (Durrell, 2018). Whilst migration is 
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multi-causal, Durrell (2018) argues that the influence of climate change on migration is already 
apparent in the region. For example, evidence links drought in Syria between 2007 and 2010 
with mass migration to urban centres, exacerbating a number of factors that contributed to unrest 
(Kelley et al., 2015).  
Mitigation, adaptation and resilience opportunities 
Opportunities for mitigation, adaptation and resilience include: 
• Strengthen adaptive capacity: effective institutions are crucial for adaptive capacity. 
Potential pathways to support institution building include supporting cross-sectoral 
coordination to implement water-energy-food nexus plans. Support for rural livelihoods 
can help to strengthen the rural households and communities adaptive capacity. Potential 
strategies include livelihood diversification, research and development for climate smart 
agriculture, access to insurance services and microfinance, and, circular economy 
solutions e.g. water re-use.  
• Regional natural resource management: potential areas for support include 
establishing or strengthening transboundary natural resource agreements, and 
supporting the development of a regional approach to climate change. There is a school 
of thought within the evidence base around ‘blue peace’, whereby strengthening water 
cooperation in the region could also further regional peace.  
• Renewable energy: developing the region’s solar and wind energy potential could 
decrease the vulnerability of existing energy systems, increase electricity production and 
meet increasing energy demand. Development of renewable energy could support low-
carbon growth in the region, whilst exploring energy trade with Europe could benefit the 
region through job creation, whilst helping Europe decarbonise its electricity system.  
• Finance: there is an identified need for adaptation finance and concessional finance in 
the region. Over 80% of climate finance from international public finance flows supports 
mitigation, largely in the form of funding for renewable energy (Patel et al., 2016; 
ECSWA, 2019). However, adaptation is a key priority amongst Arab states (ESCWA, 
2019).  
Challenges  
Elements of the region’s political economy may pose challenges for realising the above 
opportunities. These include the confluence of crises the region is facing: water crisis, climate 
crisis and a security crisis (Schaar, 2019). The three crises cannot be understood in isolation 
from each other and the links between the three are complex, diverse and multi-directional 
(Schaar, 2019). Other key elements include: 
• The role of military and security elites in power structures and the economy: with 
the exception of Tunisia, where the military do not play a leading role, across the region 
military and security elites are heavily involved in both political and economic structures.  
• The region’s reliance on hydrocarbons: oil revenues are falling and climate change 
mitigation efforts across the globe could lead to a further decline in oil markets. This 
could be both a risk and an opportunity as a shift away from fossil fuels to renewable 
energy could threaten elites’ political and economic interests. But, there is a potential for 
this to open up new avenues for dialogue as elites shift to retain their power.  
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• Varying civic space: there is limited civic space across the region to debate climate and 
environment issues. Whilst some countries have more established civil society and non-
governmental organisations who play a role in debates, others have repressed 
environmental activism and targeted activists.  
• Covid-19: the impacts of the pandemic pose immediate risks to economic recovery and 
stability in the region. For example, Jordan’s near-term growth prospects have been 
substantially weakened due to Covid-19.  
Evidence base 
This rapid literature review draws on peer reviewed, practitioner and grey literature. Sources 
were identified during general searches including ‘climate change *MENA *sector’ and 
‘adaptation *MENA’. Some sources were also identified through snowballing. This review found a 
relatively large evidence base related to the water crisis in MENA and climate change trends in 
the region, as well as a relatively large evidence base related to the region’s political economy. 
Potential evidence gaps identified by the searches undertaken for this review include: climate 
finance flows in the region; and, green growth and low carbon growth, aside from renewable 
energy potential, in the peer reviewed literature. More targeted searches are needed to ascertain 
whether these are indeed evidence gaps. Nature-based solutions were not considered in this 
study as the author was aware an independent assessment study has been commissioned.  
2. Climate change trends 
Climate impact scenarios are generally more serious in MENA, when compared to other 
regions (Schaar, 2019; Waha et al., 2017). Climate change trends include (Schaar, 2019; 
UNDP, 2018; Waha et al., 2017): 
• Rising temperatures and extreme heat: projected sharp increase in the number of 
warm days and nights and more days of extreme heat: the warm spell duration index 
could reach 200 days if global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions continue at the current 
level. By 2099, unusual heat extremes will occur in 30-65% of the summer months 
almost everywhere across the MENA region, and temperatures could reach nearly 50°C. 
Parts of Algeria and Iraq could be 8°C warmer than they are now. Under a 2°Celsuis (C) 
of global warming scenario (hereafter 2°C scenario), the number of consecutive hot days 
is projected to increase in several capital cities in the MENA region: from four days to 
about two months in Amman, from eight days to about three months in Baghdad and 
from one day to two months in Damascus. Parts of the region could become 
uninhabitable for humans and cities will feel an increasing urban heat island effect1.  
• Increasing uncertainty in rainfall and water availability: under a 2°C scenario, 
countries along the Mediterranean, notably Morocco, Algeria and Egypt are projected to 
receive substantially less rain. There could be up to a 20% reduction in rainfall, which 
combined with higher rates of evaporation will reduce water availability. There has been 
 
1 Heat island effect is where metropolitan or urban areas are hotter than the rural areas surrounding them.  
   
 
5 
an increase in meteorological drought since the 1960s, consistent with the region’s 
overall drying trend.  
• Water availability: annual water discharge is projected to drop by 15-45% under a 2°C 
scenario, and up to 75% under a 4°C scenario. Water availability is projected to decrease 
across the region throughout the 21st century, with the exception of the southernmost 
areas. Mountain areas in Morocco, Algeria, Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Iraq and Turkey play an 
important role in the region’s water supply as they generate large amounts of run-off. 
Reductions in snowfall and snow water storage, combined with peak flows of melt water 
shifting towards earlier months will negatively impact downstream river systems and 
water availability. Runoff is projected to decrease in the Eastern Anatolian mountains by 
25-55% under a 4°C warming scenario.  
• Desertification: changes in temperature, precipitation and extreme events may 
contribute to desertification as climate change interacts with local conditions and other 
drivers.  
• Sea level rise: projections of sea level rise range from 0.35 metres to an upper bound of 
1 metre. Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt are vulnerable, with Egypt likely to be the 
most severely affected.  
• Extreme events: increase in extreme drought conditions across the region, with 
increases in the number of drought days. One study suggests there could be more than 6 
months per year with at least moderate drought conditions on average in 2080-2100 
under a 4°C warming scenario. Storm surges are projected to become more intense with 
up to 50% of the coastal population of Yemen at greater risk of storm surges and 
potential GDP losses across the region of USD 12.7 billion by 2100 due to storm 
intensification. Increases in intense rainfall events, particularly in the southern part of the 
region, Oman and Yemen, could lead to increased flood events with related life and 
economic losses. Dust and sand storms could also increase.  
3. Key sectors and climate change risks 
Agriculture 
Climate change may negatively affect agricultural production in a number of ways 
including shifting vegetation and agricultural zones northwards, shortening growing 
periods, and reducing crop yields (Waha et al., 2017). Meta-analysis of peer reviewed studies 
and scenario modelling suggest a significant correlation between crop yield decreases and 
temperature increases (Waha et al., 2017). Crop yields are projected to decline by 30% under 
1.5-2 °C  warming scenario, with legumes and maize crops excepted to be the most affected in 
both the Maghreb and the Mashrek by mid-century (Waha et al., 2017). Livestock will also be 
negatively affected in various ways including changes in the length of the grazing season, 
additional heat stress, and changes in disease and disease vectors: herders in northeast Syria 
lost almost 85% of their livestock due to drought between 2005 and 2010 (Waha et al., 2017). 
The region’s agricultural sector is important for both livelihoods and economies. The 
sector employs more than 35% of the region’s population and contributes 13.5% to the region’s 
GDP against a global average of 3.2% (Durrell, 2018; Waha et al., 2017). Approximately 70% of 
agriculture is rain-fed (Waha et al., 2017). The region is vulnerable to temperature and 
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precipitation changes: most of the region receives less than 300 mm of annual rainfall, whilst the 
lower limit for rain-fed agriculture is 200-300 mm (Waha et al., 2017). This has associated 
consequences for food security and livelihoods (Durrell, 2018; Waha et al., 2017). Most 
agriculture takes place in the semi-arid climate zones close to the coasts or in the highlands 
(Waha et al., 2017). 
Water  
Water scarcity is a defining challenge in the region. The World Bank (2018) estimates that 
60% of the population live in areas with high or very high surface water stress with reduced 
available amounts of water for immediate use, e.g. drinking or irrigation. Per capita availability is 
below 1000 m3 (the threshold below which a country is facing water scarcity) in most countries, 
with the exception of Iraq, Oman, Syria, and Lebanon (Waha et al., 2017). The World Bank 
estimate that economic losses from climate related water scarcity could be up to 6% of GDP by 
2050 due to impacts on agriculture, health and incomes. Jordan is ranked as the second water-
poorest country globally, whilst increasing desertification driving by, amongst others, overgrazing 
and inefficient irrigation techniques, has reduced land suitable for grazing by 70% in the past 
three decades (IMCCS, 2020). 
Renewable resources are over-exploited and depleted. For example, the Nile and Jordan 
rivers are ‘closed rivers’: there is no unallocated water. Many aquifers are over-exploited, far 
beyond natural replenishment rates. Withdrawal-to-availability ratios exceed a critical threshold of 
40% in all MENA countries except Lebanon; they exceed 100% in Jordan, the Republic of 
Yemen, Libya and most of the Arab peninsula countries leading to groundwater resource 
depletion (IMCCS, 2020).  
Transboundary water resources play an important role in the region’s water supplies. For 
example, the Tigris and Euphrates rivers account for 98% of Iraqi water supply for drinking, 
sanitation and irrigation (IMCCS, 2020). As the Mesopotamia Basin receives between 150-300 
mm of rainfall annually but experiences 1,500- 2,500 mm of evaporation per year, it is estimated 
that 92% of Iraq’s total surface area is subject to desertification, while 100 km2 of fertile land are 
lost each year because of salinization (IMCCS, 2020). Transboundary rivers have been sources 
of regional tension, including downstream riparian countries’ concerns over dam development 
plans by upstream riparian countries.  
Water stress in the region is not simply a matter of scarcity, it is also linked to poor 
management and governance. For example, agricultural policies in Syria have encouraged the 
depletion of groundwater supplies, exacerbating the impacts of climate-induced droughts (Kelley 
et al., 2015). Per capita water use is high, with some parts of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
countries having the highest per capita water consumption rates in the world, whilst having some 
of the biggest gaps between renewable water supplies and demand.  
Increasing consumption, paired with undervalued water, inadequate governance 
arrangements, and weak enforcement is leading to the depletion of water resources— 
especially groundwater—at an unprecedented rate (World Bank, 2018). Competition between 
different water uses is growing. Unmanaged trade-offs in the water-energy-food nexus are also 
contributing to an over-exploitation of water resources (World Bank, 2018). Climate change will 
have negative pressures on water availability and in this context, the World Bank (2018) argues 
that urgent action is needed to allocate and use water more wisely. However, there is little 
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predictive data on changes in sectoral uses of water and the literature on water competition 
between agriculture and other sectors is limited to the use of grey water (Tull, 2020). 
Wastewater, particularly water pollution due to industrial pollution, is a problem in the region and 
could be harmful to human health, environmental security and food security (Keulertz, 2019). In 
2016, Israel closed its Ashkelon desalination plant for several days due to sewerage from Gaza 
(Bromberg & Giordano, n.d.).   
Many water utilities and water service providers in the region’s conflict-afflicted countries 
(Syria, Iraq, Yemen and OPTs), as well as Lebanon and Jordan, home to large refugee 
influxes, have been unable to continuing delivering water. Diep et al. (2017) outline a 
number of challenges utilities and service providers in Lebanon, Jordan, Yemen, Syria, Iraq and 
Palestine face, including lack of revenues, lack of contingency plans and stocks of water 
chemicals.  
Energy 
The political economy of energy in MENA characterised by (Avis, 2020): 
• the availability of large supplies in conventional oil and gas resources;  
• the pivotal role played by hydrocarbon wealth in many MENA oil and gas producers’ 
economic development since the 1960s and 1970s;  
• the particular social contract in many MENA countries where energy has, for many 
decades, been considered a public good to be provided by governments, if not for free, 
then at prices that have in many cases been merely a fraction of their price in any other 
international market for most of these countries’ modern histories.  
CO2 emissions are high in MENA for a number of reasons including lifestyle and 
consumption patterns. For example, per capita emissions in many MENA countries are 60% 
higher than the average among developing countries (Patel et al., 2016). CO2 emissions reached 
a historic high in 2018 (Schaar, 2019). The same socioeconomic trends driving GHG emissions 
are also driving water demand (SEI, 2012). The oil-producing countries of the region have the 
highest energy consumption per capita, the highest energy subsidies and the lowest level of 
renewable energy use (Schaar, 2019).  
Whilst there is growing investment in renewables (e.g. solar power in Morocco), the use of 
fossil fuels remains high. Estimates suggest that in 1971 fossil fuel energy consumption 
represented 95.08% of total regional energy consumption; this peaked in 2008 at 98.71%. As of 
2015 fossil fuel energy consumption represented 97.38% of total energy consumed, highlighting 
the limited uptake of alternative fuel sources (Avis, 2020). For a fuller discussion of energy issues 
in MENA, see Avis’ (2020) rapid literature review.  
The water-energy-food nexus  
Food imports, abstraction of groundwater, wastewater reuse and desalination are the key 
regional coping strategies for water scarcity (Waha et al., 2017). Water scarcity prevents 
MENA countries from producing all their food domestically and increases reliance on food 
imports (Waha et al., 2017). There is a high dependence on food imports across the region: 
approximately 50% of domestic wheat and barley supply, 70% of rice consumption and 60% of 
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corn consumption are met through imports (Waha et al., 2017). Imports may intensify with 
population growth, which makes the region vulnerable to price shocks on global markets and 
harvest failures in other world regions (Waha et al., 2017). Climate change may also have 
implications for nutrition as it could reduce the nutrient content of staple foods (Durrell, 2018). For 
a fuller discussion of food security in the region see Tull (2020).  
The concept of virtual water was developed in relation to the MENA region (Allan, 2001). 
Allan (2001) argues that the MENA region ran out of water in the 1970s and ran out of water for 
self-sufficiency in the 1950s: virtual water, water imported in food, has met MENA food needs 
and is a potential solution to the water crisis in MENA. However, the viability of depending on 
virtual water is likely to be affected by political economy factors and also assumes that MENA 
countries will continue to have the economic resources to pay for growing food imports.  
In many MENA countries, the agriculture sector is the biggest water consumer: 85% of 
total water withdrawals are for agriculture and irrigation systems are approximately 46% efficient 
(IMCCS, 2020). Increasing water efficiency in the sector (e.g. better irrigation) could help to save 
water, but will need to be placed within an enabling agricultural/irrigation policy framework.  
Desalination is used to meet water needs in a number of countries but it can use large 
amounts of energy and contribute to GHG emissions. Over 46% of the world’s desalination 
capacity is in MENA and countries across the region rely on desalinated water to varying extents 
(World Bank, 2018). There is a need to reduce the environmental cost of water production at 
desalination plants, including water loss minimisation and efficient energy usage (World Bank, 
2012). Solar powered desalination is a potential solution to these problems (World Bank, 2012).  
Water and energy markets are heavily subsided (Waha et al., 2017). Efforts to make resource 
use more sustainable (or adapt to falling revenues in the oil-producing countries) by employing 
price instruments and reducing subsidies, carries the risk of social unrest if they are not 
accompanied by targeted social protection measures to counter the risk of increased vulnerability 
(Schaar, 2019).  
High population growth and increasing urbanisation is increasing pressure on water and 
land, and increasing food, energy and water demands. Population growth of about 2% 
annually is predicted to lead the region’s population to double by 2070-2080 (IMCCS, 2020; 
Waha et al., 2017). The region’s urban population is expected to double by 2050, to nearly 400 
million (IMCCS, 2020). Population growth, migration and urbanisation will increase food and 
water demands and could increase dependency on food imports and vulnerability to agricultural 
shocks outside the region (IMCCS, 2020; Waha et al., 2017). 
Health 
Climate change may increase waterborne disease incidence, dengue fever, and morbidity 
and mortality due to extreme heat and extreme weather events (Waha et al., 2017). High 
temperatures can cause heat stress, heat exhaustion, and heat stroke, with the elderly, the 
young and people with existing medical conditions the most vulnerable (Waha et al., 2017).  
Ahmadalipour & Moradkhani (2018) project that mortality risk for people aged over 65 years 
caused by excessive heat stress across the MENA region will increase in the distant future (up to 
2100) by 8-20 times higher than that of the historical period (1951-2005) if no mitigation is 
implemented. This can be limited to 3-7 times higher if global warming is limited to 2 °C 
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(Ahmadalipour & Moradkhani, 2018). The coastal regions of the Red sea, Persian Gulf, and 
Mediterranean Sea indicate substantial increase in mortality risk (Ahmadalipour & Moradkhani, 
2018). Air pollution, already a significant health burden, could increase due to heat extremes 
(Waha et al., 2017).  
Coastal zones 
The human population in the MENA region as well as agricultural, industrial and other 
economic activities tend to be concentrated in coastal zones (Waha et al., 2017). The 
population of MENA’s coastal cities was approximately 60 million people in 2010, but the number 
is expected to reach 100 million by 2030 (Waha et al., 2017). Key impacts of climate change in 
coastal zones include slow-onset sea level rise, floods and damage caused by extreme events 
such as storms and storm surges, saltwater intrusion into coastal aquifers and increased erosion 
(Waha et al., 2017). Coastal aquifers in Tunisia, Egypt and Israel are already suffering from 
saltwater intrusion due to over-extraction and reductions in recharge: sea level rises will 
aggravate saltwater intrusion, salinization of groundwater, rising water tables and impeded soil 
drainage (Waha et al., 2017).   
Egypt is particularly vulnerable as the Nile Delta and Mediterranean coast is responsible 
for at least 30-40% of the country’s total agricultural production (IMCCS, 2020). Moreover, 
30% of the labour force works in the agricultural sector, predominately in the Nile Delta (IMCCS, 
2020). Up to one-third of Egypt’s fish catches take place in the Nile Delta lagoons and would be 
negatively impacted by salinization (IMCCS, 2020). A 0.5 m rise in sea level in Alexandria, Egypt, 
could force 1.5 million of the city’s population to leave their homes (Durrell, 2018). Across MENA, 
cities and urban areas are a migration destination, but climate change impacts could lead to 
urban dwellers migrating.  
Migration 
Histories of mobility and migration in the MENA region include pastoralism and more 
recently migration to the Gulf Cooperation Council countries and from North Africa to 
Europe (Durrell, 2018; Waha et al., 2017). For example, an estimated 36% of international 
migrants in the MENA region are from other MENA countries with the top countries of origin 
being the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs), Syria and Egypt (Durrell, 2018). Climate 
change may disrupt traditional patterns of mobility within the region (Waha et al., 2017).  
Whilst migration is multi-causal and many interconnected factors influence the decision 
to migrate, studies of the MENA region are beginning to link migration and climate 
change, particularly due to water scarcity (Waha et al., 2017; Durrell, 2018). UNDP (2018) 
argue that displacement could become more likely in some parts of the Arab world due to 
tensions over shared resources under conditions of scarcity; drought; desertification; and climate 
change-induced changes to water and land availability. Writing across the MENA region as a 
whole, Durrell (2018) argues that the influence of climate change of migration flows and 
displacement is already apparent and it is generally accepted that climate-induced migration will 
increase as climate change intensifies. One particular pathway linking climate change impacts 
and migration argues that migration from rural households may increase as impacts are felt on 
the viability of agriculture, ecosystems and rural livelihoods (Durrell, 2018).  
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Resource-sharing should be incorporated into reconciliation and reconstruction 
arrangements (Schaar, 2019). The MENA region is home to large internally displaced persons 
(IDP) and refugee populations, including from Iraq, Syria and Yemen. Schaar (2019) argues that 
there is the potential for localised resource tensions when IDPs or refugees return home. 
Currently, the ongoing political process for conflict resolution in Yemen does not include water.  
Stability  
Climate change may act as a threat multiplier in the region, however, establishing a direct 
causal link is challenging (Waha et al., 2017). Kelley et al. (2015) argue that the drought in 
Syria between 2007 and 2010 contributed to the conflict in Syria as widespread crop failures 
were one driver of mass migration of farming families to urban centres, exacerbating a number of 
factors that contributed to unrest. However, it is important to note that rural communities’ 
vulnerability to drought was increased by government agricultural policies which led to the 
overuse of and reduced supplies of groundwater (Kelley et al., 2015). There are a number of 
other examples from the region linking water and climate impacts with social unrest or tensions. 
These include the 2008 food crisis in Egypt; local perceptions in Lebanon’s Bekka Valley link 
Syrian refugees with tensions around scarce water resources; and in Egypt in April 2018, farmers 
in the Nile Delta held demonstrations after the government imposed a sudden ban on water-
intensive irrigated rice crops (Schaar, 2019; UNDP, 2018). 
Climate change could in certain contexts and under certain circumstances exacerbate 
existing tensions and influence other causal factors that increase the risk of conflict 
(Schaar, 2019). For example, a potential pathway could be: climate change impacts communities 
already suffering water stress, increasing competition over water resources, which could add to 
existing tensions (Schaar, 2019). Climate change acts on many fronts and one event can trigger 
a cascade of responses, many indirect and hard to predict consequences of climate change may 
occur (UNDP, 2018). In fragile states, the convergence of conflict and climate change can create 
new forms of social vulnerability (UNDP, 2018).  
4. Opportunities: mitigation, adaptation and resilience 
pathways 
Strengthen adaptive capacity  
Adaptive capacity is the ability of societies to change, reduce risks and protect the 
population (Schaar, 2019). It is derived from having the right institutions, knowledge, 
technology, infrastructure, economic resources, and level of equity (Schaar, 2019). The MENA 
region is extremely diverse and adaptive capacity varies enormously within the region (Waha et 
al., 207). In terms of economic resources, GDP per capita ranges from USD 1,400 in Yemen in 
2013, to more than USD 20,000 in the oil-rich Gulf states in 2013 (Waha et al., 2017). Potential 
examples of strong adaptive capacity in the region include Tunisia’s move towards a new social 
contract following the 2011 Arab Spring. Mahmoud & Suilleabhain (2020) argue that effective 
institutions, including social norms related to tolerance and accommodation, and, the civic and 
political engagement of a well-organised and vibrant civic society (including women’s 
associations) have helped the country to move towards a new social contract despite a number 
of potential flashpoints.   
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Institutions and governance  
Well-established and effective institutions are crucial for building higher levels of 
resilience to climate change impacts and climate change shocks and mobilising adaptive 
capacity (Waha et al., 2017; Schaar, 2019). Institutions can help to resolve conflicts linked to 
resource scarcity and competition (Schaar, 2019). Adaptive capacity can be strengthened 
through institution-building, providing access to resources and increasing political stability 
(Schaar, 2019). Governance is also important for adaptive capacity with relevant features 
including: the quality of governance (e.g. voice and accountability), absence of violence, political 
stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption 
(Schaar, 2019).  
Institutions already weakened by conflicts or crisis have less capacity to build resilience 
to climatic changes and extreme events (Waha et al., 2017). The depth of changes related to 
conflict or crisis, such as population displacement, infrastructure destruction and economic 
damage, may determine if climate-induced stress escalates into a severe crisis (Schaar, 2019).  
Both adaptation and mitigation are urgently needed – and that to be effective, they cannot 
be undertaken in isolation, but rather must be mainstreamed into countries’ development 
strategies (SEI, 2012). Cross-sectoral (inter-ministerial) coordination will be important (SEI, 
2012). Integrated Ministries of Water and Energy, such as in Lebanon, could have the potential 
to implement nexus plans and tackle climate change (SEI, 2012). SEI (2012) recommend 
periodic review of national adaptation plans to incorporate new information and to build 
integrated, cross-sectoral solutions. Existing strategies need to be implemented through 
corresponding action and investment plans (SEI, 2012). Mainstreaming climate change 
adaptation in conjunction with poverty alleviation, development and environment planning will be 
complicated in countries dealing with instability (SEI, 2012). Drought and flood preparedness 
plans are also needed.  
Levels of ambition in existing climate policies and Nationally Determined Contributions 
(NDCs) vary by country grouping and often reflect the dominant role of hydrocarbons in the 
region, although Syria, Libya and Yemen do not have NDCs (Schaar, 2019): 
• Oil-producers: brief NDCs with limited details or quantitative targets. Climate policies 
are anchored in a framework of diversifying their economies to reduce dependence on 
volatile oil export revenues. The Gulf Cooperation Council aim to reduce GHG emissions 
by increasing energy efficiency using available technologies and pricing policies to 
encourage savings. There are ambitious plans for wind and solar infrastructure, 
particularly in UAE. [Note: Iraq’s NDC is only in Arabic.]  
• Non-oil producers: Morocco and Tunisia have set a high level of ambition, clarity of 
strategy and concrete targets for energy efficiency, renewable energy and climate 
adaptation. These actions will help to tackle challenges related to climate change impacts 
on water availability and agricultural productivity as well as dependence on fossil fuel 
imports. The two countries have enacted legislation to anchor their climate policies. In 
Tunisia this is framed within the new 2014 constitution, and Morocco has established 
special constitutional provisions. Both countries have created institutions to promote and 
regulate the expansion of renewable energy, in Morocco’s case providing a platform for 
the ambition to play an international role.  




Small farmers play a major role in MENA’s food security and supporting viable small 
farming communities is important from a national perspective to protect food security 
(IMCCS, 2020). Smallholders produce a large proportion of the region’s domestic supply of 
staple foods and are extremely vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change of rain-fed 
agriculture (IMCCS, 2020). 
Devastation caused by extreme weather events such as droughts, floods and storms can 
undermine the long-term adaptive capacity of rural households and communities as the 
destruction of productive assets can erode the possibility of long-term recovery and the ability to 
strengthen resilience against future shocks and the progressive deterioration of environmental 
conditions (Durrell, 2018). For example, floods in Yemen in 2008 increased the poverty rate and 
resulted in a 15% rise in the number of hungry people (Durrell, 2018).  
Durrell (2018) argues that investments are needed now to strengthen resilience and maintain 
rural livelihoods, helping communities to prepare for and recover from immediate weather shocks 
such as drought, and also adapt to shifting climatic conditions over the medium to longer term. 
Durrell’s (2018) resilience strategy paper for CGIAR embraces migration as a form of climate 
change adaptation, where appropriate, to help reduce pressures in climate-vulnerable areas.  
Strategies to support vulnerable rural populations include livelihood diversification and 
community-based resilience. Lessons learned from UNDP’s (2018) work in the Maghreb, 
Mashreq and other Arab states include that providing populations with access to adapted 
financial services such as Weather Index Insurances (WII) linked with microfinance services can 
support rural populations to become more resilient to climate induced damage.  
Potential pathways recommended in the literature include climate smart agriculture and 
working on integrated approaches to the water-energy-food nexus. Innovations in the region 
include (IMCCS, 2020): 
• Research and development (R&D) into drought and heat-resistant and salt-tolerant 
crops: organisations such as the Dubai-based International Centre for Biosaline 
Agriculture are developing breeds of grass, date palms and vegetables that can 
withstand high temperatures.  
• The Sahara Forest project: located in Jordan’s Wadi Araba desert, the project aims to 
‘roll-back’ rapid desertification whilst addressing food and energy shortages. Solar power 
is used to desalinate seawater to grow crops, with the irrigation run-off used to afforest 
barren lands.  
Some innovative solutions have been piloted in response to Covid-19. For example, in Egypt, 
UN-Habitat is using riverbank filtration technology to extend affordable safe water access to 
vulnerable communities at high risk of Covid-19 infection as part of its response in the region 
(UN-Habitat, 2020).  
Regional natural resource management 
Establishing transboundary natural resource management agreements and navigating the 
potential obstacles to reaching those agreements would be a way to increase adaptive 
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capacity in the immediate future (Schaar, 2019). Addressing climate change challenges 
through regional institutions would recognise the interlinkages between climate-related change 
and security risks (Schaar, 2019). How these challenges are framed and conceptualised would 
define what actions could be taken (Schaar, 2019).   
A regional approach to climate change could also tackle a number of other areas. For 
example, regional coordination of climate information services and climate impact projection; 
food security through regional trade, coordination of market information, shared food stocks and 
dedicated funds; energy security through connecting sub-regional electrical grids; and marine 
pollution and degradation in the Gulf (SEI, 2012; Schaar, 2019). A regional approach could also 
open up new finance options and enhanced access to global climate funds (SEI, 2012).  
Regional water cooperation   
Attempts to strengthen water cooperation have been challenging in the past due to water 
being a politicised and securitised issue (Schaar, 2019). The water and climate crises are 
mostly transboundary and require states to act together, but the prioritisation of narrow security 
interests means states have accorded weak mandates to regional institutions in the past, which 
has prevented agreement on shared challenges (Schaar, 2019). For example, there is still no 
Tigris-Euphrates water sharing agreement, despite a number of efforts since the 1920s; the 
League of Arab States has downgraded its draft framework convention on shared water 
resources management to a set of guiding principles as the framework has never been 
concluded and agreed. Without a political process with security-building objectives, it may be 
difficult to constructively address needs for joint natural resource management (Schaar, 2019). 
However, water could also support furthering regional peace. Jordan and Israel view their 
bilateral water cooperation in terms of national security: water security is essential for national 
stability in Jordan and Jordan’s stability is seen as critical for national security in Israel (Bromberg 
& Giodano, n.d). Ecopeace, an NGO that brings together Israel, Jordan and the OPTs around 
water security issues, argues that the water-energy nexus can also advance stability, linking 
Jordan and Israel’s renewable energy potential with Israel’s desalination capabilities (Israel 
already sells desalinated water to Jordan at a reduced price to help it meet its own needs and the 
needs of Syrian refugees to support Jordan’s internal stability) (Bromberg & Giordano, n.d.)2. The 
NGO also argues that moving forward on water issues in the Israeli-Palestinian peace 
negotiations could help to rebuild public trust that peace is possible. Due to desalination, Israel 
has overcome its water constraints and Ecopeace argues that this means that changing water 
sharing allocations with the OPTs would not involve reducing Israel’s water availability.  
Renewable energy 
Developing the region’s solar and wind energy potential could decrease the vulnerability 
of existing energy systems, increase electricity production and meet increasing energy 
demand. Energy demand is estimated to increase by 5% per annum in the region (Avis, 2020) 
due to drivers including population growth, economic development and the increased need for 
 
2 For more information see https://ecopeaceme.org/projects/water-the-peace-process/ 
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cooling as temperatures rise.  Estimates suggest the region’s renewable energy potential could 
be up to 100 times the electricity demand of MENA and Europe combined.  
The World Bank argues there is potential for energy trade between North Africa and 
Europe3. It asserts that the costs of importing clean power from North Africa, particularly 
Morocco, which has a large solar and wind potential and an existing 1,400 MW transmission link 
with Spain, are minimal. It could also benefit the region through job creation. Algeria already 
exports gas to the EU, so there is a history of power trade. Benasla et al.’s (2019) peer reviewed 
study argues that North Africa’s solar resources could play an important role in helping the EU to 
decarbonise its electricity system and meets its energy targets in a cost-effective way.  
Transition to renewable energy in the region, as well as a global transition away from 
fossil fuels could create a ‘peace dividend’ as geopolitical risks related to contested 
hydrocarbon reserves in the region diminish (IMCCS, 2020). However, if MENA countries are 
unprepared for the economic diversification needed to transition from fossil fuel dependence, 
IMCCS (2020) argue there could be the potential for instability.  
Renewable energy and low carbon growth 
Morocco aims to reduce energy import dependency by achieving 52% of its installed 
capacity by 2030 (Kharbach & Chfadi, 2018). Morocco is a net energy importer: in 2013, energy 
import (oil, gas and coal) accounted for around 90% of national energy consumption (Kharbach & 
Chfadi, 2018). The country’s electricity sector is responsible for the highest share of energy 
consumption in the country (Kharbach & Chfadi, 2018). Fuel import dependency means that the 
country is sensitive to increases in international fuel prices and it puts a heavy fiscal burden on 
the national budget (Kousksou et al., 2015). Kharbach & Chfadi’s (2018) modelling suggests 
hydropower in Morocco could substitute for the electricity produced by coal in the short-term but 
not in the long run. Morocco has a large solar and wind energy production potential, which could 
help the country to not only reduce its GHG emissions but also pursue low carbon growth 
meeting its predicted large rises in energy demand and achieving secure energy supplies whilst 
reducing the country’s energy bill (Kousksou et al., 2015).  
Working across the water-energy nexus 
In the MENA context, adaptation is essentially about water (including water for food), 
while mitigation is about energy, and a nexus approach to water and energy planning 
could lead to smarter, more resilient development solutions (SEI, 2012). By addressing 
water and energy together, planners can identify crucial interactions, conflicting demands and 
potential synergies (SEI, 2012). Water and energy are closely interconnected. For example, 
desalination technologies can be energy-intensive and increase CO2 emissions, whilst some low-
carbon energy solutions require large amounts of energy (SEI, 2012).  
A nexus approach will require a robust scientific framework complemented by tools and 
consolidated databases to help decision-makers understand how man-made systems 
 
3 For more information see: https://blogs.worldbank.org/energy/renewable-energy-export-import-win-win-eu-and-
north-africa 
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interact with one another and with nature, and how they can be co-managed (SEI, 2012). 
The resulting solutions may serve both adaptation and mitigation, such as combining wastewater 
treatment and reuse with energy production from sludge. Or they may simply avoid negative 
impacts, as with carbon-neutral solar desalination (SEI, 2012). For example, Lebanon has large 
untapped renewable energy potential and it could address water and energy needs and climate 
change simultaneously through technologies such as solar desalination and water storage that 
co-produces hydropower and irrigation water (SEI, 2012).  
Finance 
It is hard to determine exact climate finance flows into the region but estimates suggests 
that MENA receives limited flows, with 84% of approved climate finance for the region 
supporting renewable energy between 2003 and 2016 (Patel et al., 2016; ESCWA, 2019). A 
2019 Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia review of climate finance in the Arab 
region found that Arab states received USD 4.6 billion out of USD 33.3 billion in bilateral, regional 
and other flows in 2016, with half of this being concessional loans (ESCWA, 2019)4. The main 
recipient countries have been Egypt, Qatar, Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan. The region receives 
limited flows from the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change financial mechanisms 
including the Green Climate Fund (GCF), Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF), the Special 
Climate Change Fund (SCCF), the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the Adaptation Fund. 
In 2018 and 2019, Bahrain and OPT were awarded GCF projects: only 4 countries in the region 
have received GCF funding (ESCWA, 2019). Between 2003 and 2016, seven MENA countries, 
including Libya, OPTs and UAE, received no climate finance at all (Patel et al., 2016).  
The largest proportion of public international climate finance flows into the region has 
come from the Clean Technology Fund (CTF). The CTF is a multi-donor trust fund channelled 
through certain multilateral development banks including the World Bank Group. Between 2003 
and 2016, the CTF approved support for nine projects: six in Morocco and Egypt and three 
regional projects to the value of USD 816 million (Patel et al., 2016). The largest project is a 
concessional loan for the Noor II and III Concentrated Solar Power (CSP) Project in Morocco, 
approved in 2014 by the CTF (Patel et al., 2016). This project is part of a concerted push by the 
CTF to scale-up the deployment of CSP technology across the region (Patel et al., 2016). The 
CTF’s MENA Region CSP initiative is supporting the development of 960 MW of new CSP 
capacity across Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan and Libya, with Algeria participating in technical 
assistance5. The CTF argues that CSP can contribute to energy security, climate change 
mitigation, regional integration and generate employment through technology transfer and local 
manufacturing.  
The region needs more adaptation and grant finance (ESCWA, 2019). Between 2003 and 
2016, over 83% of climate finance for MENA was for mitigation (Patel et al., 2016).  ESCWA 
(2019) found that loans exceeded grants by 5 to 1, and Arab LDCs received only 2% of flows to 
the region despite their obvious need; from a sector perspective 74% of flows were for energy, 
 
4 ESCWA covers Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania, Oman, 
State of Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates 
and Yemen 
5 For more information see: https://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/country/middle-east-and-north-africa-region 
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transport, and infrastructure and 14% for water and sanitation projects. There is also the 
suggestion that the quantity and quality of climate finance flows to Arab states is not consistent 
with nationally determined priorities (ESCWA, 2019). Whilst private climate finance is increasing 
globally, it will not necessarily be suitable to meet the need for concessional and grant finance, 
and for adaptation finance in the Arab states (ESCWA, 2019).  
Adaptation is the priority for Arab states (ESCWA, 2019). MENA countries received USD 822 
million in adaptation finance in 2018 through either direct multilateral development bank (MDB) 
funding or MDB co-financing for projects funded through the multilateral climate funds, compared 
to USD 3489 million for mitigation (EBRD, 2019). The largest share of adaptation finance went to 
crop and food production related projects and the largest share of mitigation finance went to 
renewable energy (EBRD, 2019).  
Arab states face a number of barriers to accessing the UNFCCC’s dedicated climate 
funds. These include:  
• Complex and lengthy processes: accreditation for public national entities can take up 
to 27 months, and it takes 22 months from submitting a proposal to getting approval. 
Complicated procedures can stop countries with limited institutional abilities from 
accessing funds.  
• Country cap limit by the Adaptation Fund: three Arab countries have already reached 
their cap by implementing only one project.  
• Projects financed by GEF need to be in line with the fund’s priority, fall within the 
country allocation, and contribute to global environmental goals. GEF gives more 
importance to the type of projects and the country’s capacity to manage the funds rather 
than to the vulnerability of the country to climate change.  
ESCWA (2019) recommends a number of actions that could help Arab states to negotiate, 
mobilise and efficiently target climate finance flows. These include: adopting a needs-based 
approach to identify and evaluate unmet financing needs; conducting economic costing to 
identify potential efficiencies and trade-offs of policy options; evaluating targeted opportunities for 
private sector engagement; identifying national priority climate finance needs that are not well 
suited to private sector engagement to help ensure efficient allocation of scarce public and 
international resources to national priorities; and strengthening the integration of climate actions 
into national and sectoral planning processes. Potential innovative finance mechanisms, such as 
ecosystem services, green bonds and sharia-compliant green sukuk (investments in renewable 
energy or other environmental assets), results-based financing and debt for climate swaps could 
help to mobilise additional financial resources (ESCWA, 2019). However, ESCWA (2019) argue 
these instruments cannot and should not replace public international climate finance flows. 
The UN Climate Change Secretariat’s Needs-based Finance Initiative is being operationalised in 
the Arab States through the WEGO-UN Climate Change Regional Collaboration Centre, Dubai6. 
 
6 For more information see https://worldgreeneconomy.org/arab-states-climate-finance-mobilization-access-
strategy/ 
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It aims to deliver regional clarity in mobilisation and access of climate finance to support 
identified needs.  
5. Challenges 
Confluence of crises 
MENA faces a confluence of crises (water, climate change, and security) that need to be 
addressed together (Schaar, 2019). Complex conflicts stand in the way of addressing the water 
and climate crises in MENA (Schaar, 2019). The water crisis is exacerbated by climate change 
and may fuel conflict, while insecurity is an obstacle to dealing with other pressing issues 
(Schaar, 2019). The three crises cannot be understood in isolation from each other and the links 
between the three are complex, diverse and multi-directional (Schaar, 2019). 
Internal strife focuses attention on immediate military security threats and the need for protection 
from violence, away from the water and climate crises, while draining states and societies of their 
capacity to deal with the new risks (Schaar, 2019). The growing reliance on food imports adds 
more complexity as the region’s internal stability is linked to secure natural resources 
management and political stability elsewhere, as well as the expectation that growing import 
costs can be met (Schaar, 2019).  
Role of elites 
Military and security elites play a role in power structures and economies across the 
region. Many political orders across the region are authoritarian and security-driven (Schaar, 
2019). Tunisia is an exception in the region as the military has never played a leading role and 
did not attempt to protect the Ben Ali regime during the Arab Spring (Schaar, 2019). In Egypt, the 
military owns a number of companies that have secured government contracts, and the value of 
Military Inc. is estimated to be between 5 and 40% of the economy (Schaar, 2019). In Iran, credit 
institutions under the control of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard represent one quarter of all 
banking activity (Schaar, 2019). High military spending is also a distinguishing feature of the 
region (Schaar, 2019).  
Reliance on hydrocarbons  
The exploitation of fossil fuels is central to many economies in the MENA region (Patel et 
al., 2016). MENA is home to 57% of the world’s proven oil reserves and 41% of its proven natural 
gas resources, although these are not distributed equally (Patel et al., 2016). 
Declining oil prices and revenue since 2014 has potential implications for the social 
contract in some MENA states (Muasher, 2018). It is also reducing the amount of financial 
support oil-producing countries give to non-oil producing countries (Muasher, 2018). Prior to 
Covid-19 oil prices were already falling and estimates suggests that as demand contracts due to 
the pandemic they will not regain pre-pandemic price levels in 2020. Algeria’s reliance on 
hydrocarbon revenues to fund the government and finance large public subsidies has come 
under increasing pressure since 2014 due to falling oil prices, which have impacted fiscal and 
export revenues (Cordesman, 2020). Conversely low oil prices may be good for the oil-importing 
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countries of the region. For example, in Tunisia a sharp reversal of recent oil price dynamics 
would exacerbate current account and fiscal pressures (Cordesman, 2020).   
Climate change and further decline in oil markets due to a surge in renewable energy 
investments could undermine the economic interests of the elite and ultimately the 
political order (Schaar, 2019). The realisation of the situation by elites could potentially open 
new avenues for dialogue and policy debate (Schaar, 2019).   
Varying civic space 
There is limited space for citizens to debate climate and environment issues in some 
MENA countries and governments can interpret environmental activism as a threat which 
needs to be repressed (Schaar, 2019). For example, activists have been targeted in both Egypt 
and Iran, while in UAE public discussion of the sovereign wealth fund that is based on oil 
revenue is prohibited (Schaar, 2019). In Egypt, dependence on the hydrocarbon sector for 
government revenue and to fulfil domestic energy demand, shapes the attitudes towards energy 
and environmentalism amongst both the ruling elite and the wider public (Orrnert, 2020).  
However, it is important to remember that the region is diverse and there is more potential 
for civil society action in some countries than others. In Algeria, protests against fracking 
have been met with some concessions and a counter-narrative by the government (Schaar, 
2019). Orrnert’s (2020) review of environmental engagement in the MENA, specifically Egypt, 
Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, and the OPTs found that country context and local 
dynamics shape the barriers and drivers of environmental engagement in the region. For 
example, in Lebanon, environmentalism can be seen as a way to transcend political divides 
(Orrnert, 2020).  
Vertical social structures are favoured over horizontal structures or civil society 
organisations (Schaar, 2019). Allocative systems for the distribution of resources in oil-
producing countries mean that incentives for accountability, such as to taxpayers, are absent 
(Schaar, 2019).  
Covid-19 
Covid-19 also poses immediate risks to economic recovery and stability in the region, For 
example, Jordan’s near-term growth prospects have been substantially weakened due to Covid-
19 (Cordesman, 2020). Covid-19 is also exacerbating the situation in Iraq, which faces a difficult 
fiscal crunch due to the collapse in oil prices and persistent political and social turmoil 
(Cordesman, 2020). Predictions for Iraq include a budget deficit of 19% of GDP by end of 2020, 
which would lead to a severe financing gap with potential ramifications including postponing 
infrastructure projects for service delivery sectors, postponing human capital programmes, and 
reducing the country’s ability to respond to post-Covid-19 recovery needs (Cordesman, 2020).  
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